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1  Introduction 
It is well known that Incorporated Nominals (INs) may differ across lan-
guages with respect to their discourse transparency, that is, their ability to be 
antecedents for pronouns in subsequent sentences. Moreover, there may be 
differences as to this ability within a single language with respect to INs of 
different morphological number, in languages where both morphologically 
singular and morphologically plural INs are allowed. 
For example, West Greenlandic INs are discourse transparent, cf. (1), 
while in Hindi and Hungarian plural INs are discourse transparent and singu-
lar ones are not; see (2) and (3). Farkas and de Swart (2003) (F&dS, hence-
forth) also argue that Hungarian INs may not antecede overt pronouns, but 
may antecede covert ones, (4), and thus that there is one more dimension of 
possible differences.  
 (1) West Greenlandic (from van Geenhoven 1998:187): 
   Aani  qimmi-qar-p-u-q.    
   Aani.ABS  dog-have-IND-[-tr]-3Sg.   
   Miki-mik ati-qar-p-u-q. 
   M.-inst   name-have-IND-[-tr]-3Sg 
   ‘Aani has a dog1. It1 is called Miki.’ 
 (2) Hindi (from Dayal 1999): 
  a. anu  kitaab  paRh-rahii-hai. *vo  bahut acchii  hai 
   Anu book  read-PR-PROG    It  very good  be-PR 
   ‘Anu is reading a book1. It1 is very good.’ 
  b. anu apne bete ke liye laRkiyaaN dekh rahii hai.  
   
OK  
 vo unkaa swabhaav jaannaa caahtii hai. 
                                                          
*This paper has benefited from the discussion at the 31st PLC, as well as from 
the valuable comments of Chris Barker, Anna Szabolcsi, and two anonymous re-
viewers. Many thanks to Olga Lukhminskaya for her help with constructing Hungar-
ian examples and to Anna Szabolcsi for her judgments and, again, for the help with 
constructing examples in Hungarian. Of course, all remaining mistakes are my own. I 
am grateful for the partial support of this work by the National Science Foundation 
under Grant No. BCS-0418311 to B.H. Partee and V. Borschev. 
IGOR YANOVICH 368 
   ‘Anu is seeing girls1 for her son.  
   She wants to find out their1 temperament.’ 
 
 (3) Hungarian (from Farkas and de Swart 2003:135): 
  a.  János1  beteget2    vizsgált   a rendelıben 
   Janos patient.Acc   examined  the office.in 
    
?? ∅1 Túl  sulyosnak találta   ıt2  
     he
  
too   severe.Dat  found   he.Acc 
      és beutaltatta   ∅2   a korházba. 
      and intern.Cause.Past  him  the hospital.in 
   ‘Janos1 patient2-examined in the office. 
    He1 found him2 too sick and sent him2 to hospital.’ 
 
  b.  János1  betegeket2   vizsgált   a rendelıben 
   Janos patient.Pl.Acc examined  the office.in 
    
OK ∅1 Túl  sulyosnak találta   ıket2  
     he
  
too   severe.Dat  found   they.Acc 
      és beutaltatta   ∅2   a korházba. 
      and intern.Cause.Past  them the hospital.in 
   ‘Janos1 patients2-examined in the office.  
    He1 found them2 too sick and sent them2 to hospital.’ 
 
(4) Hungarian (from Farkas and de Swart 2003:135-136): 
  János1  beteget2    vizsgált   a rendelıben 
  Janos patient.Acc   examined  the office.in 
  ‘Janos1 patient2-examined in the office.’ 
 
   a. A singular IN binding an overt pronoun: 
    
?? ∅1 Túl  sulyosnak találta   ıt2  
     he
  
too   severe.Dat  found   he.Acc 
      és beutaltatta   ∅2   a korházba. 
      and intern.Cause.Past  him  the hospital.in 
    ‘He1 found him2 too sick and sent him2 to hospital.’ 
 
   b.  A singular IN binding a covert pronoun: 
    
OK ∅1 Túl  sulyosnak találta   ∅2  
     he
  
too   severe.Dat  found   he.Acc 
      és beutaltatta   ∅2   a korházba. 
      and intern.Cause.Past  him  the hospital.in 
    ‘He1 found him2 too sick and sent him2 to hospital.’ 
INCORPORATED NOUNS AS ANAPHORIC ANTECEDENTS 369 
Farkas and de Swart set up a Discourse Representation Theory-based 
(DRT) framework to capture these data. They introduce a new kind of vari-
able—thematic arguments—whose properties should help capture the prop-
erties of INs. The thematic arguments extension to classical DRT is de-
scribed in Section 2. However, as I show in Section 3, this extension in fact 
does not work as intended because of two technical problems. In the same 
section, I describe the improvements which allow the theory to actually work. 
In Section 4, I discuss F&dS’s analysis of the distinction between singular 
and plural INs with respect to anaphora, cite old and new data on the subject, 
and argue that F&dS’s analysis is based on an empirical generalization 
which makes too sharp a distinction between singular and plural INs. In Sec-
tion 5, I propose a new analysis of the data from Section 4 which allows to 
explain the generalization that plural INs usually allow and singular INs usu-
ally do not allow anaphora, as well as the exceptions to this generalization. 
Whether this new analysis is in fact viable is subject to future empirical re-
search, but at least it allows for a natural account of the known set of data 
and makes interesting predictions about incorporated mass nouns, which 
have not received much attention in previous studies of incorporation. 
2  The Thematic Arguments Framework 
The widely accepted informal view on nominal incorporation states that an 
IN does not provide a full-fledged verbal argument, but instead forms a 
complex predicate with the verb, like the English “berry” in the compound 
“berry-picking”. The nominal does not occupy a semantic argument slot, but 
rather adds a restriction on possible objects of picking (cf. Dayal 2003, 
Chung and Ladusaw 2003, a.o.). The incorporated nominal usually does not 
constitute a full-fledged DP, and its interpretational import is different from 
the import of such a DP. Rather than introducing a discourse referent (or 
something like that) and filling the argument slot, the IN serves as a semantic 
adjunct. There are many conceivable ways to capture this basic intuition, 
some of them are present in the literature. One such theory is that of Farkas 
and de Swart (2003), to be discussed below.   
F&dS build their theory as an extension to DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993, 
a.o.) First of all, F&dS introduce a new type of variable, in addition to the 
familiar discourse referents: thematic arguments. Their notational convention 
requires to use u, v, t for discourse referents and x, y, z for thematic argu-
ments. Both discourse referents and thematic arguments are essentially logi-
cal variables ranging over individuals. The difference between the two 
classes of variables lies in DRS-construction (Discourse Representation 
Structure) and interpretation rules: the rules treat them differently.  
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First, there is a difference concerning how the two types of variables are 
introduced into DRSs. In short, “normal”, full-fledged argument DPs intro-
duce “normal” discourse referents, while “unusual” incorporated nominals 
introduce “unusual” thematic arguments. The actual story is a bit more com-
plex, however. F&dS argue that lexical items, when they come from the 
lexicon, carry with them DRS-conditions in which arguments are represented 
by thematic arguments. For example, the noun “student” carries a condition 
student(x) (remember that we use x-z for thematic arguments, not discourse 
referents), and the verb “leave” carries a condition leave(x). When these 
lexical items are processed (or, more precisely, when the corresponding part 
of the syntactic structure is processed) during DRS-construction, the process-
ing rules, in the simplest case, replace thematic arguments with discourse 
referents. For the thematic arguments of common nouns, this job is per-
formed by the rules associated with determiners, and for the thematic argu-
ments of verbs, by the rules for combining the verb with its syntactic argu-
ments. What is important is that only discourse referents may be listed in the 
universe of a DRS. Thematic referents are “less independent”, and they do 
not appear in the universe.  
I will illustrate how this system works with the example of processing 
the sentence “A student leaves” and refer the reader to Farkas and de Swart 
(2003) for more technical details:1  
 (5) a. Syntactic representation: 
   { : [ [DP a [NP student]  [VP leaves]]]} 
  b. The common noun is processed: 
   { : [ [DP a [NP student(x)]  [VP leaves]]]} 
  c. The article introduces a new discourse referent and “binds” the 
thematic argument of the common noun to it (Determiner Instan-
tiation, in F&dS’s terms): 
    {u : [ [DP u [NP student(u)]  [VP leaves]]]} 
  d. The verb is processed: 
    {u : [ [DP u [NP student(u)]  [VP leave(x)]]]} 
  e. The verb combines with its argument (Argument Instantiation, in 
F&dS’s terms): 
    {u : [ [DP u [NP student(u)]  [VP leave(u)]]]}2 
                                                          
1I use the following conventions for representing DRSs: {… : …} corresponds 
to a box, the universe of the DRS being described to the left of the “:”, and the condi-
tions—to the right of it. [] stands for familiar syntactic constituency. Words (parts of 
the syntactic structure) are in normal font, and meanings are in bold.  
2Farkas and de Swart (2003) do not discuss explicitly the deletion of syntactic 
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So in the “normal” course of events, DRS conditions enter into the DRS 
along with thematic arguments, but these arguments are replaced with dis-
course referents, or instantiated, during the derivation.  
For noun phrases, the instantiation of the thematic argument is per-
formed by the determiner. However, since there is no D in incorporated 
nominals, they are left with thematic arguments in the conditions they intro-
duced. By the time such a nominal must combine with the verb, it does not 
have a corresponding discourse referent, and thus a different mode of com-
bination must be used. While full-fledged DPs combine with the verb via 
Argument Instantiation, a rule replacing the relevant thematic argument of 
the verb with the discourse referent introduced by the DP, incorporated 
nominals combine with the verb via Unification: 
 (6)  Unification. Replace the relevant thematic argument y of a verbal 
predicate with the thematic argument z contributed by a nominal ar-
gument of the verb.  (Farkas and de Swart’s 2003 (83), p. 65) 
Here is the result of Unification for a Hungarian incorporation example:  
 (7) János  beteget  vizsgált.   









Of course, such a DRS may not be interpreted with the standard verify-
ing rules, because the standard rules may not deal with the thematic argu-
ments. F&dS formulate the relevant verification rule as follows: 
(8) A function f verifies a condition of the form P(a1, …, an) relative to 
a model M iff there is a sequence 〈e1, …, en〉 ∈ En, such that 〈e1, …, 
en〉 ∈ I(P), and if ai is a discourse referent, ei = f(ai), and if ai is a 
thematic argument, ei is some element in E.  
   (Farkas and de Swart’s 2003 (82), p. 63) 
                                                                                                                            
structure from the DRS, and we follow them. It would not be hard to formulate the 
construction rules more accurately, so that they would put the conditions directly in 
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Thus, embedding functions do not store the values for thematic argu-
ments as they do for discourse referents: it suffices to have an individual 
which satisfies a condition for that condition to be verified. After it has been 
verified, we do not keep track of this individual. Note that this is different 
from how discourse referents are treated in DRT: the verifying values for 
discourse referents are remembered by the embedding functions, and that 
ensures that all instances of the same discourse referent get the same value. 
The verification rule in (8) does not enforce the same for thematic arguments. 
If so, how then do F&dS capture anaphoric references to incorporated 
nominals? They formulate a special connective for such anaphoric depend-
encies, ≈, which is different from the usual = used for anaphoric conditions 
in the standard variant of the theory. The first argument of the connective ≈ 
must be a discourse referent, and the second a thematic argument (hence it is 
syntactically different from the “=”, both arguments of which are discourse 
referents). The part of the pronoun introduction rule that adds a condition 
with ≈ is formulated as follows: 
 (9) … If an accessible and suitable discourse referent u cannot be found, 
add a condition of the form v ≈ xi, where xi is an accessible and 
suitable thematic argument that is part of a condition P(x1, …, xi, …, 
xn) in ConK or ConK’ of some K’ that is superordinate to K.3  
   (Farkas and de Swart (2003), p. 144) 
Farkas and de Swart formulate the following verification clause for con-
ditions introduced by (9):  
(10)    A function f verifies a condition of the form v ≈ xi, where v is a dis-
course referent and xi is an (uninstantiated) thematic argument that 
shows up in the i-th position of a predicative condition of the form 
P(x1, …, xi, …, xn), iff f maps v onto the individual ei that is the i-th 
element of the n-tuple 〈e1, …, en〉 that verifies the condition 
P(x1, …, xi, …, xn). 
   (Farkas and de Swart (2003), p. 144) 
                                                          
3While F&dS do not define the notions of accessibility and suitability, the for-
mer does not seem to be needed, since they explicitly mention that the condition host-
ing a thematic referent to which the pronoun is bound may occur only in superordi-
nate DRSs. As for the latter notion, it seems that F&dS presuppose that “suitable” 
means here either “satisfying sortal restrictions and the pronoun’s presuppositions”, 
or “such as intended by the speaker”, or both. Either way, it makes sense, so we will 
not discuss it further.  
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3  Tuning up the Thematic Arguments Framework 
Although Farkas and de Swart (2003) presents intriguing data and intuitively 
clear informal analysis for it, unfortunately, their formal system fails to give 
the intended results. The problem is connected to thematic arguments—the 
new type of variable introduced by F&dS. The interpretation of thematic 
arguments is regulated by two verifying rules: (8) for regular conditions with 
thematic arguments and (10) for conditions of the form v ≈ xi. Both rules are 
insufficient for the purposes for which they are formulated: namely, (8) does 
not provide the intended interpretations for simple DRSs with incorporation, 
and (10) does not provide the intended interpretations for anaphora referring 
to thematic arguments.  
 (7)  János  beteget  vizsgált.   









Consider the interpretation of (7), repeated here, under the rule in (8). (8) 
states that to verify a condition containing a thematic argument, we need 
only to find some individual satisfying the condition. Imagine a situation 
where there is a patient named John, and a nurse named Mary, and where 
János examined Mary, who is not a patient, and did not examine John. To 
satisfy the condition patient(x), we need to find an individual who is a pa-
tient. There is such an individual, namely, John, so the condition is satisfied. 
To satisfy the condition examined(x,u), we need to find some individual 
who was examined by u (János). Mary is such an individual, because she 
was examined by János, and thus this condition is too satisfied. So F&dS’s 
rule predicts that (7) is true in this situation, while actually (7) is false.  
The problem is clear: while it is intended that the two instances of x in 
(7) “refer” to the same individual, (8) does not require it. An anonymous 
reviewer has suggested that this problem may be dealt with by requiring that 
all conditions in a DRS be interpreted as conjoined; then the two instances of 
x in (7) would be in the same big formula, not in two different formulas, and 
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seem like a good solution to me, though it certainly is a matter of personal 
taste rather than of empirical consequence. In standard DRT, DRS conditions 
are interpreted as though they were conjoined, but it is not the direct effect of 
conjoining them, but of using embedding functions to keep track of dis-
course referents. So why should we use literal conjunction after we introduce 
thematic arguments, if we have not done so when we had only discourse 
referents? Another problem with using literal conjunction is that it will not 
help once the problem with the anaphoric rule in (10) is considered. 
An alternative solution is to allow embedding functions to keep track of 
thematic arguments too. In effect, thematic arguments will be listed in the 
universe part of a DRS just as discourse referents are. This change from the 
original F&dS proposal is not very serious: even under F&dS (2003), both 
are just different types of variables.  
Another problem concerns the other rule for thematic argument interpre-
tation—the one in (10). The rule states that the discourse referent introduced 
by the pronoun must be mapped to the individual which may be referred to 
by a thematic argument which serves as an antecedent. The nature of this 
problem is the same: since we do not keep track of what individuals thematic 
arguments refer to, we cannot ensure that the pronoun picks up the very 
same individual that was picked when we interpreted the condition with the 
thematic argument: the pronoun may refer to any individual satisfying the 
condition, not only to the exact individual we used to verify its truth.  
While it was possible to solve the first problem by stipulating that all 
conditions in a DRS must be interpreted as conjoined, it will not help us to 
solve the second problem, because the anaphoric condition may be part of an 
embedded DRS, and the conditions from embedded DRSs may not be simply 
conjoined with conditions of a higher DRS: If they are just conjoined, then 
the discourse referents from the universes of the embedded DRSs will obtain 
text-level scope. However, if we allow embedding functions to “record” the 
values of thematic arguments, as suggested above, the problem disappears, 
and anaphoric reference to thematic arguments will be as simple as it is to 
discourse referents.  
It is not that all the differences between the two types of variables dis-
appear after such changes to the framework: there still remain several impor-
tant differences concerning how thematic arguments and discourse referents 
are treated by the theory. It is important to note that the changes we have just 
introduced are of a technical nature: applied to F&dS’s framework, they al-
low it to actually derive the results the authors wanted to derive. 
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4  Singular vs. Plural Incorporated Nominals 
Farkas and de Swart argue that the differences between plural and singular 
INs in Hindi and Hungarian, shown in (2-3), should be explained as follows: 
both singular and plural INs introduce thematic arguments, and not discourse 
referents; however, the plural morphology carries a presupposition of exis-
tence of a discourse referent. Furthermore, they stipulate that presuppositions 
introduced by morphological markers must be accommodated as locally as 
possible. Therefore, plural INs have a corresponding discourse referent, and 
thus may be referred back to by a general anaphoric mechanism; singular 
INs, on the other hand, may be referred back too only with the help of the 
special mechanism associated with the ≈ connective. Some languages lack 
this mechanism altogether, as Hindi, while such languages as Hungarian use 
it, but more restrictively than the usual anaphoric mechanism. 
(4), according to F&dS, further demonstrates the need to have such a 
special mechanism specifically for singular, but not for plural INs: while a 
singular IN cannot antecede an overt pronoun in (4a), it can antecede the 
covert pronoun in (4b), which suggests that the DRT rules for this type of 
pronoun are different, and only the rule for the latter allows for ≈ introduc-
tion. 
However, there are reasons to suspect that there is no such distinction 
between covert and overt pronouns in Hungarian: if we replace the singular 
IN in (4a) with a full-fledged DP, the resulting example should be grammati-
cal, according to F&dS’s predictions; yet (11) is as bad as (4a): 
 (11) ??/* János1  vizsgált   [egy  beteget]2  a rendelıben 
   Janos examined  [INDEF patient].Acc   the office.in 
    ∅1 Túl  sulyosnak találta   ıt2  
    he
  
too   severe.Dat  found   he.Acc 
   ‘Janos1 patient2-examined in the office.  
    He1 found him2 too sick.’ 
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out to me, Hungarian generally does 
not allow overt pronouns in the direct object position, and this is probably 
the reason why these examples are bad. What is crucial is that the overt pro-
noun is equally bad with a singular IN and a full DP as an antecedent, and 
hence there is no need to have different rules for overt and covert pronouns 
in Hungarian: whatever rules out (4a) should also rule out (11).  
As for the distinction between plural and singular INs, there are facts 
suggesting that the analysis proposed by F&dS makes this distinction too 
sharp—actually sharper than it is. While it is the general tendency both in 
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Hindi and Hungarian that plural INs easily antecede anaphoric pronouns and 
singular INs do not, there are important exceptions to this: 
 (12) Dayal’s (2003) example (43): 
        anu-ne   apne  beTe  ke-liye  laRkii1  cun lii.  
        Anu       self’s  son   for   girl   has-chosen  
       ‘Anu has chosen a bride for her son.’ 
          
OK
 us-ne  us-ko1  ek  sone-ka cen    diyaa hai  
    she  her   one  gold  necklace  has-given  
    ‘She has given her a golden necklace.’ 
Similar Danish facts were reported by Asudeh and Mikkelsen (2000): 
 (13) Asudeh and Mikkelsen’s (2000) example (12): 
  a.  Vita [købte  ‘hus1]  sidste  år.   OK Det1 ligger  i Hals. 
    Vita bought  house1  last   year  It1  lies  in Hals 
  b.  Mikkel [holdt ‘forelæsning1].  *Den1 var  spændende. 
   Mikkel  held   lecture1     It1  was interesting 
Somewhat surprisingly, a Hungarian example parallel to (13a), with a singu-
lar IN, allows anaphora too (Anna Szabolcsi’s judgment, p.c.): 
 (14) A bátyám   házat1 vett   a múlt héten.   
  ‘The brother house1-bought last week’ 
         
OK
 Egész  vagyont  adott  érte1.  
    ‘He  spent a fortune for it1.’ 
This suggests that F&dS’s analysis too strongly differentiates between 
the semantics of singular and plural INs. While plural INs in languages like 
Hindi and Hungarian allow anaphora better than singular ones, the distinc-
tion is not as razor-sharp as F&dS describe it. While the data presented in 
this section is clearly just one of the steps to a better understanding and much 
empirical work is needed before any definite conclusions may be drawn, the 
empirical picture emerging so far may be summarized as follows: 
 (15) a. Plural INs normally allow anaphora.  
  b. Singular INs usually do not allow anaphora. 
  c. However, there are certain contexts in which singular INs sup-
port anaphora much better than in other contexts. 
The question of what those contexts in which singular INs allow anaph-
ora have in common naturally suggests itself. Consider two pseudo-English 
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paraphrases of the examples above: 
(12’) Anu has bride-chosen for her son. 
(14’)  Vita house-bought last week. 
In both cases, the world knowledge about our culture supports the infer-
ence that there was, respectively, one bride and one house—we do not usu-
ally choose two brides for a single person at a time, and most people cannot 
afford to buy two houses in the same week. So in all of the examples in 
(12-14) that allow anaphora to singular INs there is at most one individual 
that may be referred to by the IN, according to our world knowledge. 
I cannot see how Farkas & de Swart’s theory would naturally account 
for this significant fact. In fact, the very existence of the “exceptions” in (12-
14) is hard to explain within their theory, which states that plural INs are 
crucially different from singular INs in that they presuppose a discourse ref-
erent. In the next section, I propose a new analysis of the singular-plural IN 
distinction which is intended to capture not only the general tendency that 
plural INs allow and singular INs generally do not allow anaphoric reference 
to them, but also the apparent exceptions in (12-14).  
5  Alternative Theory: Constructing Discourse Referents 
with the Help of the Context 
I propose that thematic referents may never support anaphora directly; what 
seems to be anaphoric reference to a thematic referent is in fact reference to 
a discourse referent constructed using the context in which the thematic ar-
gument appears.  
The classic variant of DRT described in Kamp & Reyle (1993) uses two 
procedures for the construction of a new discourse referent. The first one is 
Summation—a procedure that can produce a new plural referent summing up 
several already existing referents, needed for such examples as (16). The 
second operation is Abstraction, which creates a new referent referring to the 
sum of all individuals satisfying the conditions in both restrictor and nuclear 
scope of a tripartite quantificational structure. Abstraction is needed to ac-
count for discourses like (17), where “they” refers to the senators who came 
in. 
(16) Lisei met Annj yesterday. Theyi+j had not seen each other for years. 
(17) Most senators came in. They were angry.  
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Note that Abstraction must produce the maximal possible individual, e.g., 
“they” in (16) cannot refer to a subset of those senators who came in. It can 
refer only to the maximal set.  
I propose to introduce a third operation of this kind, TA-Abstraction, 
an analogue of Abstraction for contexts with thematic arguments. Here is the 
rule for this operation and the verification clause for conditions it produces: 
(18) Take a DRS K and turn it into K1, adding to it a new discourse refer-
ent v and a condition of the form v= Σx.K’, where K’ is the copy of 
K. 
(19) Function f verifies v= Σx.K’ in M iff f(v) = ⊕ {a: a ∈ UM ∧ (function 
f ∪ 〈x,a〉 verifies K’)}  
Informally, (19) says that the new discourse referent v refers to a sum of 
all individuals a which can satisfy the conditions of K’ when they are substi-
tuted for all the instances of the thematic argument x. In other words, this 
discourse referent refers to a maximal group of individuals that can be used 
to verify the conditions with the thematic argument x abstracted over.  
The maximality of the constructed discourse referent helps to explain 
the differences in behavior between singular and plural INs and the “excep-
tions” in (12-14). As was shown by Farkas & de Swart (2003), plural INs 
denote non-atomic individuals, while morphologically singular INs are num-
ber-neutral, and there are both atomic and non-atomic objects in their deno-
tation. Suppose we want to construct a new discourse referent from a context 
with a plural IN. To use an anaphoric pronoun we need to know the number 
of atomic individuals denoted by the newly introduced referent, because we 
have to choose an appropriate anaphoric pronoun. In the case of a plural IN, 
it poses no problem—this referent may not be atomic, because plural INs 
may not refer to atomic individuals, so anaphoric reference is in principle 
possible. 
Now take the case of a singular IN. In general, we do not know if there 
is just one atomic individual satisfying the condition or there are more—or, 
even if the speaker knows it, the linguistic form she uses leaves that unspeci-
fied for the hearer. Thus it is not clear whether the new referent must be sin-
gular or plural, and I argue that this is what makes such anaphora bad. In 
principle, it is conceivable that the speaker might just generalize to the plural 
case, construct a plural individual and use a plural pronoun. But since plural 
regular DPs are not number-neutral, the speaker would cancel the number-
neutrality in doing so, which is probably the reason why this option is actu-
ally not possible. 
The seeming exceptions to this general rule in (12-14) receive a natural 
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explanation within the system just described. The problem with singular INs 
lies in their number-neutrality. However, in (12-14) world knowledge allows 
us to infer that the maximal individual referred to by the thematic argument 
is at most atomic. Hence the problem disappears, and the speaker may suc-
cessfully construct a singular referent and use a singular pronoun. 
While it would require a lot of empirical work to understand if our the-
ory is actually viable, there are several interesting predictions it makes which 
point out novel kinds of data possibly relevant to the proper analysis of 
nominal incorporation. For example, our theory predicts that if a language 
uses only singular for mass nouns and mass nouns may be incorporated, then 
in such cases anaphora to singular INs should be possible: since the mass 
individual may not be plural, no conflict should arise. For now, I do not 
know if this prediction is borne out. 
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